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$Title{Civilizations Past And Present
Document: John Maynard Keynes On Clemenceau}
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$Author{Wallbank;Taylor;Bailkey;Jewsbury;Lewis;Hackett}
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}
$Date{1992}
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Title:       Civilizations Past And Present
Book:        Chapter 30: Tragic War And Futile Peace: World War I
Author:      Wallbank;Taylor;Bailkey;Jewsbury;Lewis;Hackett
Date:        1992

Document: John Maynard Keynes On Clemenceau

John Maynard Keynes caught the spirit of the peacemakers at Versailles in his
work, The Economic Consequences of the Peace. His portrait of Clemenceau is
especially revealing.

     He felt about France what Pericles felt of Athens - unique value in her,
     nothing else mattering; but his theory of politics was Bismarck's. He
     had one illusion - France; and one disillusion - mankind, including
     Frenchmen, and his colleagues not least. His principles for the peace
     can be expressed simply. In the first place, he was a foremost believer
     in the view of German psychology that the German understands and can
     understand nothing but intimidation, that he is without generosity or
     remorse in negotiation, that there is no advantage he will not take
     of you, and no extent to which he will not demean himself for profit,
     that he is without honor, pride, or mercy. Therefore you must never
     negotiate with a German or conciliate him; you must dictate to him.
     On no other terms will he respect you, or will you prevent him from
     cheating you. But it is doubtful how far he thought these
     characteristics peculiar to Germany, or whether his candid view of
     some other nations was fundamentally different. His philosophy had,
     therefore, no place for "sentimentality" in international relations.
     Nations are real things, of whom you love one and feel for the rest
     indifference - or hatred. The glory of the nation you love is a
     desirable end, - but generally to be obtained at your neighbor's
     expense. The politics of power are inevitable, and there is nothing
     very new to learn about this war or the end it was fought for; England
     had destroyed, as in each preceding century, a trade rival; a mighty
     chapter had been closed in the secular struggle between the glories
     of Germany and of France. Prudence required some measure of lip
     service to the "ideals" of foolish Americans and hypocritial
     Englishmen; but it would be stupid to believe that there is much
     room in the world, as it really is, for such affairs as the League
     of Nations, or any sense in the principle of self-determination except
     as an ingenious formula for rearranging the balance of power in one's
     own interest.

From John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1920).